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CONTRACT

WITH

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION, COST OF WORK

the case of Horgan v.
3fayor, etc., 55 N. E. Rep. 204, 206, 1899, citing Messenger v. Gity
of Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 196, 1860, and Mulholland v. Mayor, etc, 113
N. Y. 631, 1889, the facts were as follows:
"The plaintiff . . . entered into a contract in writing with
the city of' New York to furnish . . . all the necessary materials and labor, and excavate, remove and dispose of all silt, sediment
and other materials deposited in the bottom of the pond . . .
and construct a concrete bottom over same. . . . Plaintiff seeks
to recover in this action for extra work under the contract .
...
"The sheet of water known as the 'Pond' is a small lake in
Central Park. . . . The pond had an outlet consisting of a cirINCREASED RY ACT OF AIUNICIPALITY.-In
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cular gate twenty inches in diameter, resting on the bottom, and
connecting by pipe with one of the city sewers. There was also an
overflow basin about twenty-five feet from the gate, and five or six
feet higher, which also led to one of the city's sewers. .. . Subdivision 1 [of the contract] provides that plaintiff shall furnish 'all
labor and materials required for conducting the flow and draining
off the water from the bottom during the prosecution of the work.'
Subdivision 2 states that plaintiff shall furnish ' all labor and materials required for conducting the flow of water thro' or across the
area of the pond, or any portion thereof, and all pumping or bailing
or other work required.' Subdivision 5 requires plaintiff to provide
'all labor and materials required for conducting the flow of water
thro' or across the area of the pond to the outlet, or for draining
water from any portion of the area, and all pumping or bailing
required for the proper prosecution of the work during its progress
and until its completion.' Subdivision 33 reads as follows: 'all loss
or damage arising out of the nature of the work to be done under
this agreement, or from any .unforeseen obstrucion or difficultiez
which may be encountered in the prosecution of the same, or from
the action of the elements, or from incumbrances on the line of the
work, or from any act or omission on the part of the contractor or
any person or agent employed by him, not authorized by this agreement, shall be sustained by the said contractor.' In the blank form
of proposals for estimates under which the plaintiff made his bid is
this provision: 'Bidders must satisfy themselves by personal examination of the location of the proposed work, and by such other means
as they may prefer, as to the accuracy of the

. . . estimate,

and shall not at any time after the submission of an estimate dispute
or complain of such statement . . . , nor assert that there was
any misunderstanding in regard to the nature or amount of the work
to be done.'

.

.

. It was proved at the trial that the plaintiff

made the personal examination of the location of the proposed work
as required. Shortly after the contract was executed the plaitiff
requested the proper city authorities to draw off the water from the
pond, and thereupon the circular gate, twenty inches in diameter
. . . as already described, was opened, and the water was drawn

down to a depth of fourteen inches, when the outlet-pipe ceased to
work. An examination disclosed that the pipe or sewer was very
seriously obstructed and unless the same was cleared out no further
. .

water could be drawn from the pond."

.

Bartlett, J. in delivering the opinion of the court said "The
question that lies at the threshold of this case is, did the city owe the
duty to the plaintiff of having the outlet pipe of this pond in
working order? . . .
Without answering this question or further considering the point
raised, he proceeds: "A fair construction of the contract on this
point authorized the contractor to assume that the pond could be
drained of water, in a general sense.

.

.

. The contract did not

contemplate the contractor pumping out the water of the lake, in a
general sense .

.." It was proper for plaintiff to assume that the

water of the lake could be discharged into the sewer thro' the outlet
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the city had constructed for that purpose. This construction of the
contract falls within the familiar rule: ' The meaning of a contract
is to be gathered from a consideration of all its provisions, and the
influences naturally derivable therefrom, as to the intent and object
of the parties in making it and the result which they intended to
accomplish by its performance.'"
"The additional point is taken on behalf of the city that, even if
the contract should be construed as we have indicated, nevertheless
the plaintiff has waived all claim for extra work by reason of subdivision 33 of the specifications." [see above.]
"When this provision is reasonably construed, it does not operate
against the plaintiff as contended. It must be held to apply to the
work to be done, and the unforeseen obstructions or difficulties which
may be encountered under the agreement. The unforeseen obstruction that was encountered, and that subjected this plaintiff to a large
amount of extra work, was entirely outside the contract, and stands
unaffected by this provision."
If such an occurrence as this is "outside the contract," we should
like to know what things can be included in a contract. Surely,
the language of Sec. 33 is comprehensive enough to include this.
In a sense, the stopping up of a drain was not a contingency provided for by the terms of the contract, because it was not expressly
mentioned. But it would seem, in another and more obvious sense,
to be within the contract, as it is expressly stipulated that "all loss
. . . arising . . . from any unforeseen obstruction or difficulties . . . shall be sustained by said contractor." We are

unable to follow the logic of the learned judge to the effect that
the saving clause does not apply because the contractor, in
assuming an obligation to cover the bottom of the pond with concrete and impliedly also to dispose of all the water in the pond, did
not consider that the normal method of draining it oIl might fail.
In other words, it is incomprehensible that a man can declare his
liability for the consequences of an unforeseen contingency and then,
when the contingency occurs, seek discharge because he did not
foresee it.
Apropos of this, we would invite attention to a recent utterance of
the Supreme Court of the United States.

" .

.

.

It may be well,

to briefly recall certain well-settled rules in this branch of the law.
One is that if a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good unless his
performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, or
the other party. Difficulties, even if unforeseen, and however great
will not excuse him. If parties have made no provision for a dispensation, the rule of law gives none, nor, in such circumstances,
can equity interpose." Shiras, J., in United States v. Gleason, Oct.
1899 (not yet reported).
It only remains to add that the decision of B organ v. the Mayor
was rendered by a divided court and overruled both decisions in the
lower courts.
Compare this case with Fresno Milling Co. v. Fresno Canal Co.,
59 Pac. 141, digested in A. L. R. for March, 1900, at p. 177.

